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Abstract
Background: Clinical decision-making has been conceptualized as a sequence of two separate processes:
assessment of patients’ functioning and application of a decision threshold to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to justify a given decision. A range of factors, including use of evidence-based screening instruments, has
the potential to influence either or both processes. However, implementation studies seldom specify or assess the
mechanism by which screening is hypothesized to influence clinical decision-making, thus limiting their ability to
address unexpected findings regarding clinicians’ behavior. Building on prior theory and empirical evidence, we
created a system dynamics (SD) model of how physicians’ clinical decisions are influenced by their assessments of
patients and by factors that may influence decision thresholds, such as knowledge of past patient outcomes. Using
developmental-behavioral disorders as a case example, we then explore how referral decisions may be influenced
by changes in context. Specifically, we compare predictions from the SD model to published implementation trials
of evidence-based screening to understand physicians’ management of positive screening results and changes in
referral rates. We also conduct virtual experiments regarding the influence of a variety of interventions that may
influence physicians’ thresholds, including improved access to co-located mental health care and improved
feedback systems regarding patient outcomes.
Results: Results of the SD model were consistent with recent implementation trials. For example, the SD model
suggests that if screening improves physicians’ accuracy of assessment without also influencing decision thresholds,
then a significant proportion of children with positive screens will not be referred and the effect of screening
implementation on referral rates will be modest—results that are consistent with a large proportion of published
screening trials. Consistent with prior theory, virtual experiments suggest that physicians’ decision thresholds can be
influenced and detection of disabilities improved by increasing access to referral sources and enhancing feedback
regarding false negative cases.
Conclusions: The SD model of clinical decision-making offers a theoretically based framework to improve
understanding of physicians’ behavior and the results of screening implementation trials. The SD model is also
useful for initial testing of hypothesized strategies to increase detection of under-identified medical conditions.
Keywords: Clinical decision-making, Threshold, Screening, System dynamics, Behavioral disorders, Developmental
disorders
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Background
Evidence suggests that the profusion of clinical practice
guidelines has had variable effects on the behavior of
physicians [1–3] and that the field of medicine is marked
by high levels of practice variation, which is often cited
as a sign of waste [4, 5]. From their perspective, physi-
cians report that standardized guidelines are often too
rigid to apply to the complex presentations of individual
patients [6, 7], and the Institute of Medicine/National
Academy of Medicine concurs that clinical guidelines are
not a “one-size-fits-all approach” [3, 6, 7]. Thus, challenges
to the implementation of evidence-based practices often
arise from the behavior of the participants involved. As
others have concluded, efforts to improve healthcare
would benefit from greater understanding of how physi-
cians make decisions and what would motivate them to
change [8, 9].
Screening for developmental-behavioral conditions, which
affect up to 20% of children, offers a prime example.
Despite evidence for the importance of early intervention,
less than one third of children with such disabilities are
typically identified in primary care [10, 11]. US organiza-
tions such as the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)
have recommended evidence-based screening instruments
to improve detection [12, 13], and use of screeners has in-
creased sharply in recent years [14]. In addition, numerous
studies have been conducted to understand the effect of
implementing screening in primary care [15]. Results sug-
gest that case disposition is seldom determined purely by
screening scores—physicians and other decision-makers
typically play a large role. Table 1 lists 16 implementation
trials for developmental or behavioral screening in primary
care. Among the ten trials that reported relevant data,
referral rates among children with positive screens
ranged from 10 to 86%, suggesting that a substantial
proportion of children with positive screens are not re-
ferred. In addition, implementation of screening often
resulted in unexpected changes in referral rates. In the
nine trials with relevant data, changes in referral rates
ranged widely—from a significant decline to increases
of several times the original referral rate. The potential
for a decline is consistent with a recent meta-analysis
of depression screening trials that found an average 3% de-
cline in referrals [16]. Thus, screening can lead to unex-
pected outcomes.
Without an appropriate theory of clinicians’ behavior,
results such as these are counterintuitive at best. As many
have argued, theory is essential to effective implementa-
tion [17–19]. In this case, a coherent theory is needed to
understand why primary care clinicians behave as they do
and what would motivate them to change [9].
Decision analysis can be extremely useful for under-
standing screening and referral decisions [20–23]. For
example, the “general assessment and decision-making
model” posits that two independent elements underlie
any decision—one’s assessment of the situation and the
threshold used to determine whether the amount and
weight of evidence is sufficient to justify a given decision
[23]. In decision analysis, a decision threshold represents
a point of indifference where the costs and benefits of
referral are perceived to be in balance. If the appraisal of
a patient’s risk or symptom severity meets or exceeds
the physician’s decision threshold, action will be taken; if
not, no action will be taken. Thus, referrals are made when
the benefits of action are perceived to outweigh the costs.
In contrast, when the likely costs of referral are perceived
to outweigh the benefits, no referral will be made.
An important insight of threshold models is that variation
in referral decisions across providers, studies, or contexts
can be conceptualized as resulting from differences in the
accuracy of assessment, differences in decision thresholds,
or both. Moreover, threshold models suggest that assess-
ment and decision thresholds are each influenced by differ-
ent factors functioning at the level of the decision-maker or
in the decision-maker’s context. For example, physicians’
accuracy in assessing patients’ symptoms may be influenced
by factors that include the provider’s skills and training,
time available for examination, and access to relevant infor-
mation. In contrast, decision thresholds are likely to be in-
fluenced by a separate set of factors, “such as emotions,
regret of omission versus commission, financial incentives”
[8], and other factors that influence perceptions regarding
the costs and benefits of referral [24–26].
The explanatory power of threshold models can be ex-
panded through integration with signal detection models,
where decision thresholds are often referred to as “cut
scores.” Whereas decision analytic models help to describe
how a physician’s threshold may change in response to
perceived changes in the costs and benefits of referrals
[20, 27], signal detection models demonstrate the impact
of thresholds on the frequency of true positive (TP), false
positive (FP), true negative (TN), and false negative (FN)
results. By integrating these two approaches, we can learn
more about the physicians’ perspectives on the clinical sig-
nificance of threshold changes not only for individuals,
but also for the populations of patients they serve.
To better understand physicians’ decision thresholds
and their implications for patient populations, we devel-
oped a system dynamics (SD) model that integrates in-
sights from both decision analysis and signal detection
theory. SD models are sets of coupled differential and
other relational equations designed to simulate the inter-
dependent behavior of processes over time [28]. Just as a
model airplane offers a way to understand the structure
of an aircraft, SD modeling’s “causal loop” and “stock-and-
flow” diagrams provide intuitive visualizations of complex
systems. Similar to using a wind tunnel to efficiently test
hypotheses regarding a prototype airplane’s performance,
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Table 1 Implementation trials of developmental and behavioral screening
Reference Sample
size
Setting Type of screening Physicians’ recognition of
disorders among children with
positive screens (%)
Referral rate among children
with positive screens (%)
Change in recognition rate
attributable to screening
(Relative risk)
Change in referral rate
attributable to screening
(Relative risk)









Developmental screening 1.27 (95% CI 0.91–1.76) 1.18 (95% CI 0.72–1.93)














Developmental screening 74.4% (95% CI 66.0–81.7%)






10.3% (95% CI 2.2–27.4%) 0.65 (95% CI 0.23–1.84)




Behavioral health screening 62.5% (95% CI 45.8–77.2%) 4.64a
Gall et al. 2000 [76] 383 school based clinic Behavioral health screening 80.8% (95% CI 67.5–90.4%)




Behavioral health screening 1.98a





















Behavioral health screening 0.89 (95% CI 0.66–1.12) 0.63 (95% CI 0.41–0.95)















Behavioral health screening 49.5% (95% CI 39.9–59.2%) 0.89 (95% CI 0.57–1.41) 0.85 (95% CI 0.43–1.69)












simulations based on SD models are designed to help de-
velop insight and hypotheses about longitudinal behaviors,
especially for systems that involve feedback loops and time
delays. SD modeling has been recommended by the
National Institutes of Health for studying policy resistance
[29, 30] and systems engineering more broadly has been
advocated for improving healthcare processes [31, 32],
including by the Institute of Medicine and National
Academy of Engineering in several joint publications [33].
Below, we describe the development and structure of
our SD model, its application to implementation trials of
developmental-behavioral screening, and a series of vir-
tual experiments designed to explore novel interventions
to improve detection of developmental-behavioral disor-
ders in primary care settings.
Methods
Development and structure of the SD model
Our SD model focuses on how knowledge of past pa-
tient outcomes influences decision thresholds (see Fig. 1).
In this model, a physician assesses the symptom severity
of sequential patients with a given level of accuracy. When
the physician’s perception of symptom severity exceeds his
or her decision threshold, the patient is referred. Other-
wise, the patient is not referred. Referral decisions can be
correct (TP or TN) or incorrect (FP or FN). After a refer-
ral decision, patients are sometimes lost to follow-up, but
other times their status becomes known to the referring
physician after a delay. Over time, information regarding
the results of some past referral decisions ultimately feeds
back and influences the physician’s decision threshold for
future patients. Known errors can lead to regret. Increased
regret about FPs may motivate a physician to raise his or
her decision threshold (i.e., requiring greater symptom-
atology to trigger a referral), thereby reducing the number
of patients referred. Conversely, increased regret about
FNs may motivate a lowering of the decision threshold
(i.e., requiring lesser symptomatology to trigger a referral),
thereby increasing the number of patients referred.
Changes in decision thresholds therefore are influenced by
the type of error (FP or FN) for which a physician has
more regret at that moment.
Any factors that influence physicians’ perceptions of a

































































Fig. 1 Overview of dynamic thresholds theory
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his or her decision threshold. The model accounts for
such factors through three primary sets of variables: one
that reflects the accuracy of the initial assessment, a sec-
ond that reflects physicians’ perceptions regarding the
relative costs of incorrect referrals (FP) and failures to
refer (FN), and a third that reflects the amount and timeli-
ness of feedback regarding FP and FN errors. Different
practice-level interventions might plausibly have different
effects on each set of variables. For example, introduction
of high-quality screening instruments is likely to increase
accuracy by providing physicians with additional informa-
tion about patients’ symptoms. However, suggested “cut
scores” may not change physicians’ decision thresholds if
they do not influence their perceptions of the costs and
benefits of referral. In contrast, addition of new referral
sources—such as co-located mental health clinicians—may
favorably influence physicians’ perceptions of the costs and
benefits of referral. Finally, systematic feedback systems
may improve physicians’ knowledge of past errors [34, 35].
As has been noted, “For many decisions we make, we are
more likely to receive feedback about some outcomes than
about others, and thus we must operate under conditions
of asymmetric partial feedback” [36]. The practice of medi-
cine is no exception. Patients often do not follow through
with referral appointments [37, 38], physicians seldom
receive feedback regarding patient outcomes [39], and
feedback regarding FP and FN cases often is delayed
[40]. On the other hand, evidence suggests that learn-
ing of adverse events resulting from specific medica-
tions influences physicians’ decision thresholds for
prescribing those medications but not others [41]. SD
models are uniquely designed to model feedback [28],
and our SD model explicitly includes feedback about
FP and FN errors occurring with different probabilities
and delays.
Model structure
Figure 2 depicts the model's structure; a full working
version is included as an Additional File 1, and instruc-
tions are included as Additional File 2. The model
begins when the physician assesses patients’ symptoms
and makes referral decisions, thus yielding TP, FP, TN,
and FN results. Physicians’ assessments and patients’
diagnostic status are modeled by drawing random num-
bers from a bivariate normal distribution, which we graph
using three dimensions:
1. “True” symptom severity is assumed to be normally
distributed in the population, consistent with









FP Lost to follow-up
FN Lost to follow-up
FP known to 
physician






















Fig. 2 Summary stock-and-flow structure of system dynamics (SD) model
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instruments can be modeled as normal distributions
[42]. In our model, prevalence of developmental-
behavioral disorders is assumed to be 15% [43].
Therefore, if a child’s “true” symptom severity falls in
the extreme 15% of the population, the patient is
classified as having a disorder.
2. Physician’s perceptions of symptom severity is also
assumed to be normally distributed, and its
correlation (rho) with “true” symptom severity
represents the accuracy of the physician’s
assessment. High correlations indicate that
physicians’ assessments display little error, while low
correlations indicate the opposite.
3. A third axis represents the frequency of children at
each point on the plane described by the first two axes.
When a random observation is drawn, the value for
“true” symptom severity determines whether or not the
child has a disorder, while the value for the physician’s
perception of symptom severity is compared to a decision
threshold to determine whether or not the child is re-
ferred. Together, these classifications determine which of
the four branches each patient follows: TP, FP, TN, or FN
Calculations for the bivariate normal distribution are in-
cluded in Additional File 3.
Our model assumes that loss to follow-up for each
type of outcome can vary over a wide range with differ-
ent time lags, and physicians experience regret when ei-
ther FN or FP errors become known. The relative regret
associated with each type of error is represented by the
FN regret weight, which can either raise or lower the im-
pact of a known FN case compared to a known FP case.
Finally, we assume that when physicians experience re-
gret regarding FP or FN errors, they adjust their decision
thresholds to reduce the likelihood of repeating that type
of error, thereby affecting future referral decisions.
Note that our model includes several simplifying as-
sumptions. For example, physicians’ assessments are as-
sumed to be unidimensional and continuous, consistent
with previous models [44] and similar to the Children’s
Global Assessment of Functioning by which clinicians rate
children’s overall functioning on a 100-point scale [45].
Additionally, we assume that the influence of known out-
comes diminishes as a linear function of time as memory
fades and past experiences become less relevant. We do
not mean to imply that physicians actually perceive pa-
tients’ symptoms and outcomes in precisely this manner,
only that this can be a parsimonious way to model their
influence on referral processes. Consistent with regret
theory [46, 47] and the approach of a prior SD model
of policy threshold oscillations [48], our model focuses
only on the influence of errors and does not explicitly
incorporate correct decisions. As originally described
by Peirce [49], the net benefit associated with a decision
can be defined as a function of the number and marginal
utility of TP and FP outcomes. This formulation serves as
the foundation for decision-curve analysis [50], and it has
been adapted by Tsalatsanis et al. [46] to focus instead on
FP and FN errors. In their formulation, the marginal utility
of a FP is equivalent to the disutility from unnecessary
treatment, while the marginal utility of a FN is equivalent
to the disutility from failure to treat. Focusing on errors in
this way has the advantage of being more parsimonious
than accounting for the full expression of net benefits, and
it is consistent with previous descriptions of the influence
of regret on decision thresholds [51].
Internal validation
To ensure that all equations were specified correctly and
as intended, the entire model was replicated by a team
of healthcare systems engineering graduate students from
Northeastern University. Performance of the original and
replicated models was identical. We also conducted a series
of tests to ensure that the model performs as expected. For
example, we tested the model under an assumption of per-
fect accuracy to ensure that the expectation of perfect sen-
sitivity and specificity are met, and we calculated the FN
regret weight that should yield equivalent sensitivity and
specificity based on regret theory [46] and tested whether
the model behaved accordingly.
Model calibration
We included several conceptually relevant variables des-
pite the fact that empirical data were sparse or unavailable,
including those variables that determine the probability
and timeliness of feedback for each outcome. To develop
values for these variables, we used a calibration process by
which values of unobserved variables are estimated by
adjusting them until output fits observed data [52]. Be-
cause relevant time series data on pediatricians’ behavior
were unavailable, we calibrated our model to results from
a recent systematic review on the sensitivity and specificity
with which physicians detect developmental and behav-
ioral disorders [11]. This systematic review found that
when pediatric providers identify behavioral disorders in
general practice, specificity typically far exceeds sensitivity,
indicating a reluctance to commit FP errors and an inclin-
ation to favor positive predictive value [11]. A bivariate
meta-analysis of reported results yielded physician sensi-
tivity = 38.7% (95% CI 26.1–53.1%) and specificity = 87.7%
(95% CI 80.2–92.5%). Estimates for FN regret weight and
loss to follow-up and delay for both FP and FN results
were adjusted until the difference between model output
and the above sensitivity and specificity values were mini-
mized, using sum of squared differences as a criterion. Be-
cause the model is underspecified, meaning that multiple
sets of parameters can meet calibration criteria, we created
a series of plausible scenarios that include ranges for each
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parameter. Scenarios included estimates of FP loss to
follow-up that ranged from 10 to 60%, delay for FN results
that ranged from 1 to 5 times the delay for FP results, and
regret for a FN case that ranged from 1 to 5 times the re-
gret for a FP case. For each scenario, FN loss to follow-up
was adjusted until the model’s average sensitivity and spe-
cificity most closely approximated the results of the sys-
tematic review. Additional scenarios were developed by
calibrating to the upper and lower bounds of the 95% con-
fidence intervals for sensitivity and specificity based on the
systematic review.
While all scenarios were included in sensitivity analyses,
a base case model was chosen to represent the most plaus-
ible scenario. For this case, we assumed a FN regret
weight = 3; i.e., that pediatricians regret a FN (missing a
true case) three times as much as a FP (referring a patient
who does not benefit). We base this assumption on the
observation that a large percentage of pediatric referrals
for mental health treatment do not result in services. Pedi-
atricians’ continued willingness to refer patients under
such conditions suggests acceptance of a number of FPs
for every child who ultimately receives services. Further-
more, we assumed that physicians’ knowledge of FP re-
sults, although imperfect, is greater than their knowledge
of FN results. Because there are seldom formal systems to
detect missed mental health diagnoses and to report such
errors back to the pediatrician, knowledge of FNs is likely
to be rare. In contrast, pediatricians are more likely to
learn that a referred patient was found to be ineligible for
services, either directly from the treatment provider or
from the patient at a subsequent visit. Thus, we specified
loss to follow-up for FP = 20% and loss to follow-up for
FN = 73%, and we assumed that delay for learning about
FP results (50 patient visits) was much less than delay for
learning about FN results (250 patient visits).
Application to developmental-behavioral screening
To test the model’s utility for exploring real-world results,
we compared model predictions to the results of published
studies described in Table 1, which were not included in
model development. To estimate summary values for the
referral rate among children with positive screens and the
change in referral rates attributable to screening implemen-
tation, meta-analyses of published results were conducted
using the metan command in Stata version 12.
We modeled the implementation of screening by altering
physicians’ accuracy (rho; i.e., the correlation between true
symptom severity and the physician’s perception of symp-
tom severity) from 0.65 (which yields a Receiver Operating
Characteristics [ROC] curve that includes sensitivity and
specificity of approximately 75%) to 0.85 (which yields an
ROC curve that includes sensitivity and specificity of ap-
proximately 85%). Note that this analysis accounts only for
increased accuracy of assessment attributable to screening
instruments; no influence on thresholds is assumed. Thus,
we hypothesized that our model would under-estimate the
results of most screening trials, which often include add-
itional interventions such as training or co-located services.
Change in identification rates was estimated by calculating
the proportion of children referred in the base case model
and then recalculating the proportion of children referred
after adjusting rho. The proportion of children with positive
screening results was represented by calculating the ratio of
children referred to the number who would score positive
with rho = .85 if a threshold were chosen based on Youden’s
index (i.e., the threshold that maximizes the sum of sensitiv-
ity and specificity, as is typical of developmental-behavioral
screeners). All scenarios identified during model calibration
were tested. Model results therefore reflect a plausible range
of parameters across trials.
Virtual experiments
To explore novel interventions designed to improve detec-
tion of developmental-behavioral disorders, we altered the
following parameters, one at a time, to investigate the
impact on performance:
 Experiment #1: increased accuracy. To simulate the
introduction of a high-quality screening questionnaire,
we increased assessment accuracy from 0.65 to 0.85,
as described above.
 Experiment #2: increased FN regret weight. Various
factors may alter physicians’ regret regarding FN
versus FP errors (i.e., the regret ratio). For example,
referrals for mental health services can be time-
consuming for both providers and patients, and
concern about stigma may provide additional barriers.
Convenient and non-stigmatizing follow-up services,
possibly through collaborative, co-located mental
health care, may reduce patients’ burden, making FP
results more tolerable. Reducing physicians’ regret for
FPs relative to their regret for FNs may induce lower
decision thresholds.
 Experiment #3: decreased loss to follow-up for FNs.
Formal systems to provide systematic feedback have
been recommended to improve patients’ mental
health outcomes [34]. We simulated such a solution
by reducing loss to follow-up for FNs, which may
motivate physicians to lower decision thresholds.
 Experiment #4: increased accuracy, increased FN
regret weight, and decreased loss to follow-up
(combined intervention). In experiment #4, we tested
the combined effect of all three parameter changes.
For each virtual experiment, average sensitivity and
specificity were calculated based on results from 3000
patients estimated after an initial run of 2000 patients to
minimize the influence of initial threshold values. For
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experiments #2–4, the magnitude of change was set to
yield sensitivity equivalent to experiment #1.
Results
Model calibration
Our base case yielded an average sensitivity of 39.6%
and an average specificity of 92.4%. For subsequent
analyses, variation was explored across the full range of
scenarios described above.
Application to developmental-behavioral screening
Figure 3a displays results from published studies and
from our model regarding referral rates among children
with positive screens. Among the nine studies with suffi-
cient data, meta-analysis indicated that an average pooled
proportion of 60% (95% CI 44–75%) of children with
positive screens were referred. However, results ranged
widely from 10 to 86%, and meta-analysis revealed statisti-
cally significant heterogeneity among studies (p < 0.0005;
I2 = 94%), suggesting that there is likely to be considerable
clinical and/or methodological differences among trials. In
comparison, the base case SD model yielded a proportion
of 42%, with values from sensitivity analyses ranging from
30 to 59%. Thus, SD model predictions fell toward the
lower end of the range of results of published trials (many
of which included interventions beyond screening), as
expected.
Figure 3b depicts the change in referral rates attribut-
able to screening. Among the seven trials reporting rele-
vant data, the Mantel-Haenszel pooled relative risk was
1.67 (95% CI 0.96–2.9). However, results ranged widely,
from a 37% decline in referrals attributable to the imple-
mentation of screening to a 333% increase, and meta-
analysis revealed statistically significant heterogeneity
among studies (p < 0.0005; I2 = 90%). We also include re-
sults from a recent meta-analysis of depression screening
trials, which found an average 3% decline in referral rates
(RR = 0.97; 95% CI = 0.81–1.18) [16]. In comparison, the
base case SD model yielded a 6% decrease in referrals at-
tributable to the implementation of screening, with
values from sensitivity analyses ranging from a 20% de-
cline to a 15% increase. Thus, while the range of values
predicted by our SD model included the results of the
meta-analysis of depression screening trials and over-
lapped with the low end of the range of results reported
in trials of developmental-behavioral screening instru-
ments, the significant heterogeneity again suggests that
there are likely to be considerable clinical and/or meth-
odological differences among trials (see Additional File
4 for more detailed description of included studies).
To further explore this heterogeneity, we recalibrated
the model to be more consistent with two studies with
extreme results. For example, one study found that re-
ferrals increased 4.3 times over baseline when screening
for suicide risk was implemented [53]. To explore plausible
parameter values that might explain this result, we first cali-
brated the model to reflect the 0.8% referral rate reported
at baseline by changing the FN regret ratio to one. As
above, we then modeled implementation of screening by
changing rho from 0.65 to 0.85, which resulted in 2.7 times
the number of referrals found at baseline. To explore what
factors might explain the even larger change in referral
rates reported in the study, we also changed the FN regret
ratio from 1 to 5.5, reflecting the observation that pediatri-
cians may be more likely to regret FN results for suicide
than for other developmental-behavioral disorders. This
change resulted in 4.6 times the referrals found at baseline,
thereby approximating study results.
A second example consisted of a study of pediatric men-
tal health screening which found referrals to increase 2.4
times over baseline [54]. To explore plausible parameter
values that might explain this result, we first calibrated the
model to reflect the 10.3% referral rate reported at baseline
in the study by changing the rate at which FN were lost to
follow-up from 73 to 80%. As above, we modeled imple-
mentation of screening by changing rho from 0.65 to 0.85,
which resulted in a slight reduction in the number of refer-
rals compared to baseline (RR = 0.99). To explore factors
that might explain the even larger change in referral rates
reported in the study, we focused on the paper’s report that
significant mental health services were provided in the pri-
mary care setting in addition to screening. We hypothesized
that provision of co-located mental health services would
decrease the perceived costs associated with a FP result,
thus increasing the FN regret ratio (because the denomin-
ator (FP) decreases as the numerator (FN) remains con-
stant). However, even an extreme FN regret ratio of 100
was insufficient to achieve this result. A complementary
hypothesis is that if co-located mental health clinicians
offer preventive interventions, then in effect the preva-
lence of children who may benefit may be higher than for
standard interventions. Changing model prevalence from
15% to 25% while holding other variables constant indeed
increased referral rates, after which an FN regret ratio of 8
was sufficient to replicate study results.
Virtual experiments (#1–4)
Table 2 summarizes parameter values for the four virtual
experiments; Fig. 4 summarizes results. Sensitivity and
specificity that fall above the dark horizontal line at
70% exceed consensus regarding minimum standards for
developmental-behavioral screening instruments [13]. De-
cision thresholds are represented as threshold probabil-
ities, which refer to the probability a child who scores at
the threshold has a disorder.
Designed to simulate pediatricians’ use of screening in-
struments, virtual experiment 1 regarding assessment accur-
acy yielded average sensitivity = 60% and specificity = 94%.
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Fig. 3 Comparison of model output to results of screening implementation trials regarding: a identification and referral rates among children
who screen positive, and b change in identification and referral rates attributable to screening
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Although 85% sensitivity and specificity were possible if
physicians selected a threshold according to Youden’s
index, our model predicted that physicians would re-
spond to the implementation of screening by raising
their thresholds, thus achieving a different point on the
same ROC curve (see “increased assessment accuracy”
in Fig. 4). By lowering decision thresholds, our two other
simulated interventions achieved similar improvements in
sensitivity, but at the cost of decreased specificity. In ex-
periment #2, increasing the regret ratio from 3 to 10
achieved average sensitivity = 57% and specificity = 83%. In
experiment #3, reducing loss to follow-up for FNs from 73
to 20% achieved average sensitivity = 61% and specificity =
81% (see “increased FN regret” in Fig. 4).
Changing all three parameters simultaneously (see
“combined intervention” in Fig. 4) simulated a combined
intervention in which assessment accuracy was increased,
regret about false negatives was increased relative to regret
about FPs, and feedback about FNs was improved. In this
scenario, average sensitivity and specificity were estimated
at 84 and 83%, respectively.
In a set of sensitivity analyses, we conducted the same
four experiments using a baseline model that assumed
60% (rather than 20%) of FP results were lost to follow-
up. To calibrate the model to achieve similar sensitivity
and specificity, the FN regret ratio was reduced to 2
(rather than 3). Using this baseline model, the results of
all four virtual experiments yielded very similar patterns
to those described above (see Additional file 5 for
results). Together, these virtual experiments suggest
that strategies that go beyond encouraging pediatricians
to use formal screening tools may be helpful for
improving detection rates.
Although our virtual experiments focused on average
values, at least one additional observation is notable:
threshold probability, sensitivity, and specificity oscillated
Table 2 Parameter values for virtual experiments
Virtual experiment Model parameters
False positives (FP) lost
to follow-up
False negatives (FN) lost
to follow-up
Assessment accuracy (rho) Regret ratio (FN/FP)
Base case 20% 73% 0.65 3
1. Increased accuracy 20% 73% 0.85 3
2. Improved feedback 20% 20% 0.65 3
3. Increased FN regret 20% 73% 0.65 10
4. Combined intervention 20% 20% 0.85 10
Values in italics indicate change compared to baseline
Fig. 4 Results of virtual experiments #1–4
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over time in all conditions. These oscillations appeared to
be larger in some conditions (i.e., virtual experiment #1)
than in others (i.e., virtual experiment #2).
Discussion
Many frameworks, such as the socioecological model
and the Consolidated Framework for Implementation
Research (CFIR), highlight the importance of considering
intrapersonal variables alongside context. The SD model
of thresholds for clinical decision-making proposes spe-
cific mechanisms to describe the relationship between
the individual and his or her setting. For a wide range of
parameter values, the assumption that screening directly
increases accuracy while having an ambiguous effect on
thresholds yields predictions that are broadly consistent
with implementation trials of developmental-behavioral
screening, including that not all positive screens will be
referred and that changes in referral rates attributable
to the implementation of screening may range widely
depending on context and even decline in some cir-
cumstances. The key insight is that depending on the
perspective of the decision-maker, increased accuracy may
reduce FP errors and FN errors to different degrees. If
only the former, the number of referrals (which include
both TP and FP results) will decrease. Although our ability
to fully validate the model is limited by a lack of study-
specific data on relevant parameters (such as physician re-
gret and rates of loss to follow-up associated with FP and
FN errors), the studies that diverged most markedly from
our model provide interesting case studies. For example,
one trial that resulted in a very large increase in both
identification and referrals (falling well beyond the range
predicted by our model) also was the only study in our
sample to focus on suicide [53]—an outcome for which
physicians are likely to regret FNs far more than for other
behavioral conditions. A separate trial that reported a very
large change in referrals also included provision of sig-
nificant mental health services in addition to screening
[54], which our model predicts will influence decision
thresholds. Thus, the model offers plausible hypotheses
to explain heterogeneity.
Our SD model also offers structured hypotheses re-
garding novel multi-level strategies to improve detection
of developmental-behavioral disorders. Similar to frame-
works that highlight the role of screening in the context
of clinical decision-making [55], our model suggests ways
in which interventions might influence not only physicians’
accuracy but also the thresholds they use to make clinical
decisions. Thus, multi-level interventions that provide feed-
back regarding patients’ outcomes and address physicians’
perceptions of the costs and benefits of referrals may
yield better outcomes than evidence-based screening
implemented as an isolated strategy. For example, a range
of recent policy initiatives may influence the key variables
in our model. Computerized adaptive testing shows
promise for increasing the accuracy of screening instru-
ments [56]. Other initiatives may influence physicians’
decision thresholds, such campaigns to reduce stigma
[57], improved connections between primary care and
mental health resources [58], and preventive services
that have lower costs but that offer benefits to a greater
proportion of children than intensive treatments [59].
It is important to highlight several limitations. As in
all models, simplifying assumptions were necessary to
produce a workable, understandable model. For example,
our model does not consider downstream effects of physi-
cians’ decisions on other service providers. Physicians’ re-
gret is likely to be informed by a range of factors that are
beyond the scope of our model, including personal (e.g.,
personality, training), interpersonal (e.g., influence from
other physicians), and contextual (e.g., quality of mental
health resources, chance of audit or lawsuit), each of
which could be the focus of a more detailed model.
Similarly, we did not explicitly model cognitive pro-
cesses that influence decision-making. For example, re-
search on hindsight bias demonstrates the influence of
memory on behavior [60]. Research on dual process
models, which posit both explicit and implicit processes
for decision-making, documents a range of systematic
biases in decision-making, such as anchoring effects and
loss aversion as highlighted by cumulative prospect the-
ory [61]. They also suggest that humans often rely on
the “gist” of information to make decisions rather than
rational deliberations regarding probabilities and util-
ities [62]. While our model represents thresholds as
probabilities, physicians may be more likely to consider
whether the amount, weight, or “gist” of evidence is
sufficient to justify a decision. Previous work suggests
that threshold models can incorporate elements of dual
process theories [51], and this presents a promising avenue
for advancing our SD model.
Despite its simplifying assumptions, our SD model
helps to extend theory on clinical decision-making in
important ways. Whereas most models of decision-making
focus on single decisions made in isolation, our SD model
recognizes that physicians make similar decisions repeat-
edly over time. Recent research suggest that humans may
approach iterated decisions very differently than single
decisions in isolation [63], for example, by under-
weighting small probabilities when making decisions
based on experience rather than overweighting small
probabilities as is typically found in experimental para-
digms that rely on explicit descriptions of probabilities
and outcomes [64, 65]. By allowing for the possibility
that individuals may learn from past experience, iterated
decision models suggest that the extent and type of feed-
back physicians receive may have strong implications for
their clinical decision-making.
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Implications for implementation science
Our SD model offers new insights into screening and
clinical decision-making that have wider implications for
implementation science. For example, our model suggests
that the behavior of physicians can influence the expected
effect of evidence-based screening instruments and clinical
practice guidelines, even if they are behaving rationally
and in the best interests of their patients. As many have
argued, it may be more useful to attribute errors to the
design and management of patient care processes than
to the limitations of individual providers [66, 67], and
therefore systems-level interventions may be needed to
improve detection. Thus, simply convincing physicians
to adopt screening instruments may fail to account for
the complexity of clinical decision-making and may
even lead to unintended consequences, such as attenuat-
ing the potential impact of screening instruments and
even diminishing physicians’ trust in expert guidelines.
Quoting the Framework for Analyzing Adoption of Com-
plex Health Innovations, it is reasonable to ask, “What are
the harmful effects of an external ‘push’ (such as a policy
directive or incentive) for a particular innovation when the
system is not ready?” [68]. Situations when seemingly ob-
vious solutions do not work as well as intended or lead to
unintended consequences are common in implementation
and have long been described in the SD literature as
“policy resistance” [69]. SD models have the potential
to highlight participants’ role in implementation efforts
and the potential downstream consequences if their re-
actions are ignored.
Our SD model also has implications for assessment in
implementation research. If success depends in large part
on local decision-makers, then greater attention to their
behavior is warranted. This includes actual decisions
made, how they are influenced by perspectives on costs
and benefits and knowledge of past outcomes, and how
these variables may change over time. For example, closer
attention to physicians’ decision thresholds, the individual
and contextual factors that influence them, and whether
and how they change over time may be helpful for under-
standing screening trials. Such data will be critical to fur-
ther develop our SD model and calibrate it to describe
clinical care.
Finally, our model highlights how the use of simula-
tion modeling to integrate and apply theory to practical
questions in implementation science can lead to novel
insights. For example, our model suggests that decision
thresholds may oscillate over time, even given stable pa-
rameters. Such behavior is common in complex systems
characterized by feedback with differential delays [28]
and oscillations have long been observed in decision
thresholds in public policy [48]. Whereas the literature
on practice variation typically focuses on inter-individual
or inter-group difference in medical care, oscillations in
decision thresholds may represent a source of intra-
individual variation. Thus, it is possible that physicians
with identical characteristics working in identical contexts
may nevertheless exhibit different behavior if they are at
different points in the same process of threshold oscilla-
tion. While model results cannot provide proof, they do
offer structured, causal hypotheses that can be systematic-
ally explored and refined in future research.
Conclusions
The sheer complexity of implementation research presents
significant scientific challenges [69]. Explicitly designed to
improve thinking about systems, SD simulation models
offer tools to assist in understanding the implications of
this complexity. As an example, our SD model offers
plausible hypotheses to explain otherwise counterintuitive
results of screening implementation trials, including the
consistent observation that physicians refer only a fraction
of children who screen positive and that changes in refer-
ral rates attributable to the implementation of screening
vary markedly across trials, but are often modest. In
addition, the model suggests that interventions designed
to influence physicians’ decision thresholds may be im-
portant for improving detection rates of developmental-
behavioral disorders. While preliminary, results suggest
that by modeling explicit causal theories, SD simulations
can complement prominent frameworks in implementa-
tion science, such as CFIR.
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